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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Evin Christopher Devan appeals his conviction from a jury verdict finding
him guilty of felony counts of conspiracy and burglary, and a misdemeanor count
of trespassing.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A jury found Evin Christopher Devan guilty of felony conspiracy, felony
burglary, and misdemeanor trespassing. (R., Vol. I, pp. 19-21, 82-83; Vol. II, pp.
151, 232.) The district court sentenced Devan to a unified term of five years with
two years fixed on each felony count, but suspended execution of judgment and
ordered probation. (R., Vol. I, pp. 120-21.) Devan timely appealed. (R., Vol. II,
pp. 127-28.)
During closing argument, the prosecutor commented that "the argument[s]
of the lawyers" were "gobbledygook" to the extent they conflicted with the court's
instructions. (Trial Tr., p. 614, L. 19 - p. 615, L. 6.) The prosecutor also stated
that the defense argument that an expert was needed to compare footprints in
the case was "insulting" because the comparison could be made using "common
sense."

(Trial Tr., p. 616, L. 10 - p. 617, L. 1.)

appeal

challenges

the

prosecutor's

(Appellant's brief, p. 10.)
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comments

Devan's sole issue on this
as

fundamental

error.

ISSUES

Devan states the issue on appeal as:
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of fundamental
error, when the prosecutor used inflammatory language calculated to
appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury, disparaged defense
counsel, and misstated the arguments raised by defense counsel?
(Appellant's brief, p. 10.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Devan failed to show error, much less fundamental error, because Idaho
case law supports that the prosecutor's comments at issue here were not
misconduct?
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ARGUMENT
Devan Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, Because
Idaho Case Law Supports That The Prosecutor's Comments At Issue Here Were
Not Misconduct
A.

Introduction
Devan argues the prosecutor committed misconduct that infringed on his

right to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) Although the alleged misconduct
was not objected to at trial, Devan asserts it rose to the level of fundamental
error thus warranting reversal.

(Id.)

Applying Idaho case law to the record,

Devan fails to satisfy his burden on appeal.
B.

Legal Standard
In general, Idaho's appellate courts will not consider allegations of error to

which counsel has failed to timely object at trial. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,
181, 24 P.3d 77, 82 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628,
634, 977, P.2d 890, 896 (1999). The exception is in criminal cases where the
defendant shows fundamental error. Norton, 151 Idaho at 181, 24 P.3d at 82.
For this, a defendant must show error that (1) violates an unwaived constitutional
right, (2) is clear or obvious from the appellate record, (3) and that affected the
outcome of defendant's trial. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961,
978 (2010)). As an initial matter, if the appellate court finds no error, it need not
address the three-prong test.

Norton, 151 Idaho at 189, 254 P.3d at 90. As

discussed below, there was no error here.
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C.

Under Idaho Case Law, The Prosecutor's
Misconduct, Thus There Was No Error

Comments Were

Not

Parties at trial are given considerable latitude in making closing arguments
to the jury. State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, 271, 270 P.3d 1054, 1056 (Ct.
App. 2011 ).

Although prosecutors are "expected and required to be fair," the

courts recognize the reality that "[a] fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial."
Norton, 151 Idaho at 188, 254 P.3d at 89 (citation omitted). In Norton, the Court
of Appeals held that the prosecutor's references to defense arguments as "red
herrings and smoke and mirrors" were not misconduct.
189, 254 P.3d at 90.

Norton, 151 Idaho at

In so holding, the court specifically noted that the

comments were not directed at defense counsel personally, but at counsel's
theories. Id.
In arguing that the prosecutor committed misconduct, Devan misquotes
and thus mischaracterizes the prosecutor's closing argument. (See Appellant's
brief, p. 13.) An accurate quote, in its proper context shows the prosecutor's
intent to clarify the correct legal standard for the jury to apply:
Gobbledygook, that's what the argument of the lawyers are, and
that's what the judge has instructed you to do (indicating). So the
first thing I'm going to ask you to do is throw out all of the argument
that the defense attorney gave you about clear and convincing
evidence, yadda, yadda, yadda. That's not the standard. You
won't find it anywhere in your jury instructions. You have an
instruction on what reasonable doubt is. If you have any doubt
about it, read it. It doesn't say anything about clear and convincing
evidence. To compare the two is an error.
(Trial Tr., p. 614, L. 19 - p. 615, L. 6.) The prosecutor argued the jury should
disregard the defense argument about "clear and convincing evidence" because
· it is not the correct standard, and is thus contrary to the judge's instructions.
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(See also Trial Tr., p. 615, Ls. 7-16.)

Because the comment was directed at

defense argument, it is not misconduct. Norton, 151 Idaho at 189, 254 P.3d at
90.
Devan also argues the prosecutor's use of the word "insulting" was
inflammatory, and therefore misconduct.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) In the

comment in question, the prosecutor challenged the defense argument that
expert testimony was needed to compare footprints, calling it "insulting." (See
Trial Tr., p. 609, L. 12 - p. 610, L. 25; p. 616, Ls. 10-15.) In other words, the
prosecutor told jurors he trusted them to evaluate the evidence without needing
an expert to do the evaluating for them.

(Trial Tr., p. 616, Ls. 16-22.) The

context of the prosecutor's comments shows they were made in response to the
defense's arguments and were not calculated to inflame the emotions and
passions of jurors. See State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 909, 231 P.3d 549,
554 (Ct. App. 2010). Thus Devan's argument fails.
Devan cites several cases in which the courts found prosecutorial
misconduct.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13.)

Those cases are distinguishable

because the alleged misconduct was not, as here, prosecutorial comments
directed at defense arguments.

Troutman, 148 Idaho at 909-10, 231 P.3d at

554-55 (prosecutor's comments improperly urged jury to return verdict based on
emotions and passions rather than evidence); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20,
189 P.3d 477, 482 (Ct. App. 2008) (prosecutor's statements improperly vouched
for state and state's witness); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583,
588 (Ct. App. 2008) (prosecutor comments that jury might be irritated by
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testimony of defendant's girlfriend and brother were improper); State v. Beebe,
145 Idaho 570, 575-76, 181 P.3d 496, 501-02 (Ct. App. 2007) (prosecutor
improperly misrepresented or mischaracterized evidence, appealed to jury to
consider factors other than evidence of guilt); State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651,
657, 691 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Ct. App. 1985) (inflammatory statements by
prosecutor implying "facts" not in evidence were improper).
Because Devan cannot establish misconduct, there simply is no error, and
the court need not address the three-prong fundamental error inquiry. Norton,
151 Idaho at 189, 254 P.3d at 90. Indeed, absent error, all three prongs of the
Perry test - violation of unwaived rights, clear error, and prejudice - are not
satisfied. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Even if the comments
were error satisfying the first two prongs of the fundamental error standard,
Devan cannot show the remaining prong, that the alleged errors affected the
outcome of his trial.

D.

The Alleged Errors Were Harmless
For the third prong of the Perry fundamental error test, defendant bears

the burden of proving a reasonable probability that the asserted error affected
the outcome of his case.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

The

overwhelming evidence supports that the jury reached its verdict regardless of
the alleged prosecutorial misconduct - the prosecutor's comments in closing.
Co-defendant Darrin Boren testified that Devan participated, with six others, in a
plan to commit burglary. (Trial Tr., p. 348, L. 13 - p. 351, L. 8; p. 353, L. 2 - p.
356, L. 4; p. 359, L. 17-p. 361, L. 23; p. 362, Ls. 2-23; p. 363, Ls. 1-19; p. 364,
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Ls. 2-5; p. 366, Ls. 9-16.) Co-defendant Tiffany Jones also testified that Devan
was part of the group that went to burglarize the property, and that she and
Devan were in the car that drove away from the scene of the crime. (Trial Tr., p.
427, L. 24 - p. 428, L. 22; p. 429, Ls. 7-21; p. 430, Ls. 1-17.) Jones testified that
during the planning, Devan said, referring to the burglary, "let's go and get this
done." (Trial Tr., p. 431, Ls. 10-20.)
Testimony by Police Officer Dale Schreiber further confirmed Devan's
involvement. Officer Schreiber testified that, as part of the burglary investigation,
he was sent to look for a vehicle with the license plate 2CFX260 that was
reported leaving the scene of the burglary. (Trial Tr., p. 400, Ls. 1-3; p. 400, L.
24 - p. 401, L. 9; p. 401, L. 19 - p. 402, L. 19.) Using the plate number, Officer
Schreiber found the vehicle was registered to Maribel McMinn, residing at 516
Ash.

(Trial Tr., p. 403, Ls. 3-14.) At trial, Devan confirmed that his mother's

name is Maribel Nelson, maiden name McMinn, and that he resides with her at
516 Ash. (Trial Tr., p. 509, L. 14 - p. 510, L. 1.)
After spotting the vehicle in a motel parking lot, Officer Schreiber parked
40 or 50 yards away and conducted surveillance. (Trial Tr., p. 403, L. 21 - p.
405, L. 2; p. 408, Ls. 2-13.) Within 15 minutes, a man later identified as Devan
approached Officer Schreiber, concerned he was being followed. (Trial Tr., p.
409, L. 13 - p. 410, L. 21.) Upon Officer Schreiber's request, Devan produced
his driver's license which showed his address as 516 Ash, the same as that
associated with the suspect vehicle. (Trial Tr., p. 411, Ls. 3-24.)
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Devan points out that the victim, Karl Riebe, could not identify Devan as
one of the burglars. (Appellant's brief, p. 15; Trial Tr., p. 217, L. 16-219, p. 10
(victim confronted two women in one car, at close range); Trial Tr., p. 229, Ls. 119 (911 dispatch, which Riebe called, told him to stay concealed).) However,
Riebe testified that there were several people and two distinct cars involved,
including the vehicle with license plate 2CFX260. (Trial Tr., p. 228, L. 4 - p. 231,
L. 24.)

Also, Devan's self-serving testimony that he was not involved in the

conspiracy is plainly insufficient to overcome the vast weight of evidence
supporting the jury's verdict against him. (Trial Tr., p. 512, Ls. 18-25.)
Given the weight of evidence against Devan, he cannot show a
reasonable probability that the jury's verdict was swayed by the prosecutor's
comments in closing argument. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Rather, the record amply supports that the jury's verdict was reached without
regard to those comments.

Even if Devan could show the prosecutor's

comments amounted to error, he has not shown the error affected the outcome
of his case.

kl

Accordingly, Devan has failed to demonstrate fundamental error

from prosecutorial misconduct. 19..:.
CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
judgment of conviction.
DATED this 7th day of May, 2013.

o:f:/JfX::;;;/F-;5:/

Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of May, 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SARAH E. TOMPKINS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

DA~~
Deputy Attorney Gene:
DJH/pm

9

